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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on an appeal from 
a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on 
November 19, 1999, following the jury's retur n of a verdict 
against appellant Anselmo Gomez, a physician, on 16 
counts of health care fraud arising from Medicare billings 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1347. The district court 
sentenced Gomez to concurrent 24-month ter ms of 
imprisonment on each count to be followed by thr ee years 
of supervised release. On this appeal Gomez raises the 
following issues: 
 
       I. The evidence, when viewed in the light most 
       favorable to the Government, was not sufficient to 
       convict Dr. Gomez of health care fraud, because it 
       proved only that his patient care may have fallen below 
       acceptable medical standards, but not that he had any 
       knowledge of, or involvement with, Aquahab's billing 
       procedures. 
 
       II. The Government's evidence that Dr. Gomez failed to 
       adhere to accepted medical practices and standards 
       was irrelevant to the issue of whether he knowingly 
       and willfully participated in fraudulent billings, and 
       also [was] unduly prejudicial, so that it was improperly 
       admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 
       403. 
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       III. The district court denied Dr. Gomez his 
       constitutional right to a defense when it refused to 
       allow him to present evidence proving that the general 
       practice of Aquahab was to exclude its doctors fr om 
       billing matters. 
 
       IV. The district court violated Dr. Gomez's fifth 
       amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, 
       when it subpoenaed him to appear before the grand 
       jury; warned him that he must testify truthfully; never 
       told him that what he said might be used against him 
       or that he did not have to answer if he did not want to; 
       and then indicted him based upon his grand jury 
       testimony. 
 
We have reviewed this matter car efully and have 
concluded that the appeal is clearly without merit and 
accordingly we will affirm without discussion except on the 
Fifth Amendment issue that Gomez raises in point IV . Of 
course, while Gomez complains that the district court 
violated his Fifth Amendment rights, he actually is referring 
to the actions of the assistant United States attor ney before 
the grand jury. We exercise plenary r eview on the Fifth 
Amendment issue. See United States v. McLaughlin , 126 
F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The circumstances underlying this point ar e as follows. 
This case arises out of a Medicare fraud investigation of 
Gomez's employer, Three Rivers Physical Therapy and 
Occupational Therapy Center, which operated the AquaHab 
program to which Gomez refers in his statement of the 
issues. Gomez does not claim that he originally was a target 
or subject of the investigation or the grand jury pr oceeding 
and the government at least denies that he was a target. 
Indeed, Gomez voluntarily cooperated with the 
investigation, at least to the extent of allowing Medicare 
fraud investigators to interview him. Nevertheless Gomez 
was not in the position of a mere witness to the events 
being investigated, as for example a witness to a r obbery, 
for some of Three Rivers' questioned billings were in his 
name and to a degree he was involved in its operations. 
 
During the investigation the government served a 
subpoena on Gomez requiring him to appear befor e a grand 
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jury in Pittsburgh and he obeyed the subpoena but 
appeared without counsel. Before the grand jury the 
following exchange took place between the assistant United 
States attorney and Gomez: 
 
       Q. Before we get started, I have a few war nings that I 
       have to give to Grand Jury witnesses. 
 
. . . 
 
       Q. First of all, you understand that you're under oath 
       here? 
 
       A. (Witness moves head in an affirmative response.) 
 
       Q. You have to answer orally, yes or no? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. And you understand that your testimony is being 
       taken down by a court reporter? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. And you understand that it's against the law to lie, 
       to knowingly misrepresent the truth to grand jurors? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. And that would be the crime of perjury or making 
       false statements; do you understand that? 
 
       A. Right. Yes. 
 
       Q. Do you understand, as well, that if you chose[sic], 
       you could have a lawyer outside the Grand Jury r oom 
       to consult with? 
 
       A. Okay. Yes. 
 
       Q. And today, did you come here with a lawyer? 
 
       A. No. No, I didn't. 
 
       Q. Okay. Now, are you willing to answer questions from 
       me and the grand jurors about - - 
 
       A. Sure. 
 
App. at 772-73. 
 
Following those warnings Gomez testified at length and 
made incriminating statements. Indeed, he contends that 
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"[f]or all practical purposes, the gover nment recognized that 
it decided to indict [him] based solely upon his grand jury 
testimony." Br. at 48. While the gover nment does not 
concede that this statement is true, there is no doubt but 
that Gomez's testimony was harmful to him. 
 
Prior to the trial Gomez moved to dismiss the indictment 
by reason of his testimony before the grand jury, 
contending that the grand jury indicted him "based upon 
compelled self-incrimination." Id. at 34. In the alternative 
he asked that the court suppress the use of his testimony 
at trial. The district court denied these motions and thus 
the trial went forward with the government using Gomez's 
grand jury testimony at the trial. As we have indicated, the 
jury convicted Gomez. 
 
On this appeal, Gomez contends that the procedure 
followed before the grand jury violated his"Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from compelled self- 
incrimination." Id. at 48. He develops his argument as 
follows. First, he correctly points out that the privilege 
against self-incrimination applies to a witness before the 
grand jury. He then argues, again corr ectly, that he was 
compelled to appear before the grand jury but he 
incorrectly contends that he was compelled to testify. He 
bases his argument that he was compelled to testify on the 
circumstance that the assistant United States attorney 
"never advised [him] that he did not have to answer any 
questions, and . . . never told [him] that anything he said 
could be used against him." Id. at 49. He attempts to 
overcome the logical problems with his ar gument, which 
does not take into account that even without a war ning he 
could have invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself, see United States v. Mandujano, 425 
U.S. 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1778 (1976), by ur ging that 
the government was obliged "to advise [him] that he could 
remain silent and that anything he said could be used 
against him . . . ." Br. at 50. 
 
Unfortunately for Gomez, the law does not support his 
argument. Indeed, he acknowledges that he"understands 
that by faulting the government for its behavior, he is in 
effect asking for an extension of the law; there is currently 
no requirement that a citizen subpoenaed to appear before 
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a grand jury be informed of his right against self- 
incrimination." Id. He nevertheless asks us to "extend the 
law" for two reasons. First, he makes the negative argument 
that Supreme Court precedents do not "foreclose" granting 
him relief, id. at 51, in this r egard citing United States v. 
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 97 S.Ct. 1814 (1977), and 
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768. He then makes 
the affirmative argument that we should exercise our 
"supervisory powers" to extend the law to r equire that the 
government be obliged to advise a witness before a grand 
jury of his right to remain silent and that his statements 
can be used against him. Br. at 51.1 The government 
argues that Gomez is wrong with r espect to existing law as 
in its view the Supreme Court precedent does foreclose us 
from granting the relief Gomez seeks, in this regard citing 
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 112 S.Ct. 1735 
(1992), Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136 
(1984), and United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 97 S.Ct. 
1823 (1977). Of course, the government also contends that 
we should not use our supervisory power as Gomez 
requests. 
 
We are satisfied that the gover nment is correct and thus 
we hold that the assistant United States attor ney did not 
have a constitutionally mandated obligation to advise 
Gomez that he could remain silent and that anything he 
said could be used against him. See United States v. 
Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1977). Moreover, 
we are convinced that even if we could do so, we should not 
exercise our supervisory power as Gomez r equests. See 
Williams, 504 U.S. at 45-50, 112 S.Ct. at 1741-44. In 
Williams the defendant contended that the Court should 
affirm the action of the court of appeals in affirming a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Gomez does not argue that the United States Attorneys' Manual SS 9- 
11:150, 9-11:151, which sets forth Department of Justice policy with 
respect to giving advice to certain grand jury witnesses and with respect 
to subpoenaing targets of a grand jury investigation, see United States v. 
Pacheco-Ortiz, 889 F.2d 301, 311-13 (1st Cir. 1989), creates any rights 
entitling him to relief. Of course, any such contention would be against 
the weight of judicial authority. See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 
350, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 802 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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district court order dismissing an indictment because the 
prosecutor did not disclose substantial exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury. The defendant, however , did not 
contend "that the Fifth Amendment itself obliges the 
prosecutor to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence in 
his possession to the grand jury." See id. at 45, 112 S.Ct. 
at 1741. Rather, he urged that the Court should uphold the 
dismissal on the basis that the court of appeals pr operly 
exercised its supervisory power. Id . The Court rejected this 
argument emphasizing that "[g]iven the grand jury's 
operational separateness from its constituting court, it 
should come as no surprise that we have been r eluctant to 
invoke the judicial supervisory power as a basis for 
prescribing modes of grand jury procedur e." Id. at 49-50, 
112 S.Ct. at 1743. 
 
We had occasion promptly to consider Williams in the 
grand jury supervisory power context in Baylson v. 
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
975 F.2d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 1992). In Baylson, after 
discussing Williams and other Supr eme Court cases, we 
indicated that Supreme Court precedent"suggest[s] to us 
that the district court may not under the guise of its 
supervisory power or its local rule-making power , impose 
the sort of substantive restraint on the grand jury that is 
contemplated" by a rule requiring a pr osecutor to obtain 
prior judicial approval to subpoena an attor ney before a 
grand jury where the prosecutor will seek to compel the 
attorney to provide evidence against his present or former 
client. 
 
Williams and Baylson supply the approach that guides us 
here. After all, nothing unfair happened befor e the grand 
jury. To start with, there is no suggestion that the 
questioning before the grand jury cover ed topics discrete 
from the subject matter that Gomez reasonably could have 
believed would be within the scope of his questioning, i.e., 
Three Rivers' billing practices and related matters. Thus, 
this is not a case in which a witness was br ought before the 
grand jury on the ruse that the inquiry concer ned a matter 
unrelated to that actually involved. Mor eover, it is beyond 
doubt that Gomez had an adequate opportunity when he 
was served with the subpoena to consult with counsel 
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regarding his rights before the grand jury and the perils of 
testifying instead of invoking his privilege against self- 
incrimination. Indeed, almost any witness subpoenaed to 
testify before a grand jury would have such an opportunity. 
Thus, the situation before us is sharply dif ferent from that 
which concerned the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966), a case on 
which Gomez relies, i.e., that a witness in custody might be 
questioned without the implementation of procedural 
safeguards to secure his privilege against self-incrimination 
even though he does not have counsel present. Therefore, 
we see no reason to impose the requir ement for warnings to 
be given witnesses in grand jury proceedings that Gomez 
requests. Consequently, we hold that the district court 
properly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment and 
correctly refused to suppress Gomez's grand jury testimony.2 
 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered November 19, 1999, will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We have noted that when the gover nment subpoenaed Gomez he was 
not a target of the investigation. We do not imply by making this 
observation that we would have reached a dif ferent result if he had been 
a target. Obviously, we cannot decide that issue as it is not before us. 
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